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Abstract
We study the equilibrium with quantity setting behavior and price setting be-
havior of firms in duopoly under relative profit maximization with constant conjec-
tural variations, and show mainly the following results. 1) Conjectural variations
of firms are irrelevant to the equilibrium of a duopoly. 2) Quantity setting behav-
ior and price setting behavior are equivalent with any conjectural variation of each
firm. 3) Any pair of conjectural variations of firms which satisfies some relation
is consistent. In particular, if firms have the same cost functions or the cost func-
tions are linear, and both firms determine the outputs or both firms determine the
prices, any conjectural variations which are common to both firms are consistent.
Therefore, there are multiple consistent conjectures.
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1 Introduction
We study the equilibrium with quantity setting behavior and price setting behavior of
firms in duopoly under relative profit maximization with constant conjectural varia-
tions. Conjectural variation in oligopoly and its consistency have been studied in many
papers such as Bresnahan (1981),Bresnahan (1983), Robson (1983), Perry (1982),
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Boyer and Moreaux (1983), Tanaka (1985) and Tanaka (1988). Bresnahan (1981) de-
fines a consistent conjectural equilibrium (CCE) and has shown the existence of CCE in
a case where demand and cost functions are linear and conjectural variations are poly-
nomial. Bresnahan (1983) has shown the existence of CCE when demand functions
are quadratic using a formulation by Robson (1983). In Perry (1982) it was shown that
in a duopoly producing a homogeneous good under constant marginal costs the com-
petitive conjecture is the only consistent conjecture. In Tanaka (1985) it was shown
that in a free entry oligopoly only the competitive conjecture is consistent. Klemperer
and Meyer (1988) presented an interpretation of Bresnahan’s formulation of consistent
conjectures as a dominant strategy equilibrium and showed multiplicity of consistent
conjectures. Kamien and Schwartz (1983), among others, showed that if the demand
is linear, constant consistent conjectural variations in quantity correspond to constant
consistent conjectural variations in price in the sense that the same equilibrium price
and quantity will be attained if either conjectural variation is constant.
We consider a duopoly in which firms produce dierentiated substitutable goods
under linear demand functions and general cost functions so as to maximize their rel-
ative profits, and we consider constant conjectural variations about outputs and prices.
We consider three frameworks.
1. (Quantity setting framework) Both firms determine their outputs (quantities).
2. (Price setting framework) Both firms determine the prices of their goods.
3. (Mixed framework) One firm determines its output, and the other firms deter-
mines the price of its good.
We show the following results.
1. Conjectural variations of firms are irrelevant to the equilibrium of a duopoly.
2. The equilibrium outputs and prices in all of three frameworks are equal, that
is, quantity setting behavior and price setting behavior are equivalent with any
conjectural variation of each firm.
3. Any pair of conjectural variations of firms which satisfies some relation is consis-
tent, and in particular, if firms have the same cost functions or the cost functions
are linear, and both firms determine their outputs or both firms determine their
prices, any conjectural variations which are common to both firms are consistent.
Therefore, there are multiple consistent conjectures.
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused
the interest of economists. Please see Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Lu (2011),
Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Miller and Pazgal (2001), Vega-Redondo
(1997) and Schaer (1989).
In Vega-Redondo (1997), it is argued that, in a homogeneous good case, if firms
maximize the relative profits, a competitive equilibrium can be induced. But in the
case of dierentiated goods, the result under relative profit maximization is dierent
from the competitive result. Miller and Pazgal (2001) has shown the equivalence
of price strategy and quantity strategy in a delegation game when owners of firms
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control managers of firms seek to maximize an appropriate combination of absolute and
relative profits. But in their analyses owners of firms themselves still seek to maximize
absolute profits of their firms. On the other hand, we do not consider a delegation
problem, and assume that owners of firms seek to maximize their relative profits.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the nature of human.
Even if a person earns a big money, if his brother/sister or close friend earns a bigger
money than him, he is not suciently happy and may be disappointed. On the other
hand, even if he is very poor, if his neighbor is more poor, he may be consoled by that
fact. About the behavior of firms, we think that firms in an industry not only seek its
own performance but also want to outperform the rival firms. TV audience-rating race
and market share competition by breweries, automobile manufacturers, convenience
store chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in Japan, are examples of such be-
havior of firms.
In Section 3 we consider a case where both firms determine their outputs (quanti-
ties). In Section 4 we consider a case where both firms determine the prices of their
goods. And in Section 5 we consider a case where one firm determines its output and
the other firm determines the price of its good.
2 The model
There are two firms, A and B. They produce dierentiated substitutable goods. Denote
the output and price of the good of Firm A by xA and pA, and the output and price of the
good of Firm B by xB and pB. The cost functions of Firm A and and B are, respectively,
denoted by c(xA) and c(xB). They may be dierent. The constant conjectural variations
of Firm A and B in the quantity setting framework are denoted, respectively, by δA and
δB. In the price setting framework they are denoted, respectively, by ηA and ηB. Assume
 1 < δA < 1,  1 < δB < 1,  1 < ηA < 1 and  1 < ηB < 1. In the mixed framework
the conjectural variations are denoted by ζA and ζB. We do not assume  1 < ζA < 1 nor
 1 < ζB < 1.
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by firms are
pA = a   xA   bxB;
and
pB = a   xB   bxA;
where a > c and 0 < b < 1. xA represents demand for the good of Firm A, and xB
represents demand for the good of Firm B. The prices of the goods are determined so
that demand of consumers for each firm’s good and supply of each firm are equilibrated.
The ordinary demand functions for the goods of firms are obtained from these in-
verse demand functions as follows,
xA =
1
1   b2 [(1   b)a   pA + bpB];
and
xB =
1
1   b2 [(1   b)a   pB + bpA]:
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Next consider a case where Firm A determines its output and Firm B determines
the price of its good. Then, the ordinary demand function for Firm A is
xA = a   pA   bxB; (1)
and the inverse demand function for Firm B is
pB = (1   b)a   (1   b2)xB + bpA: (2)
3 Quantity setting framework
Assume that the strategic variable of each firm is the output of its good. The relative
profit of Firm A (or B) is the dierence between its profit and the profit of Firm B (or
A). We denote the relative profit of Firm A by ΠA and that of Firm B by ΠB. They are
written as follows,
ΠA =piA   piB = (a   xA   bxB)xA   (a   xB   bxA)xB   c(xA) + c(xB)
=a(xA   xB)   x2A + x2B   c(xA) + c(xB);
and
ΠB =piB   piA = (a   xB   bxA)xB   (a   xA   bxB)xA   c(xB) + c(xA)
=a(xB   xA)   x2B + x2A   c(xB) + c(xA):
Firm A determines its output so as to maximize its relative profit assuming that the
reaction of the output of Firm B to the output of Firm A is
@xB
@xA
= δA;
and Firm B determines its output so as to maximize its relative profit assuming that the
reaction of the output of Firm A to the output of Firm B is
@xA
@xB
= δB:
The conditions for relative profit maximization of Firm A and B are, respectively,
a   c0(xA)   2xA   (a   c0(xB))δA + 2δAxB = 0; (3)
and
a   c0(xB)   2xB   (a   c0(xA))δB + 2δBxA = 0: (4)
From (3) and (4) we have
(1   δAδB)(a   c0(xA)) = 2(1   δAδB)xA;
and
(1   δAδB)(a   c0(xB)) = 2(1   δAδB)xB:
4
Then, the equilibrium outputs are
xA =
a   c0(xA)
2
:
and
xB =
a   c0(xB)
2
:
They do not depend on the values of δA or δB. Thus, the conjectural variations of
firms are irrelevant to the equilibrium outputs under relative profit maximization in the
quantity setting framework.
The equilibrium prices are obtained as follows.
pA =
(1   b)a + c0(xA) + bc0(xB)
2
:
and
pB =
(1   b)a + c0(xB) + bc0(xA)
2
:
Again from (3) and (4) the real reaction of the output of Firm A to the output of
Firm B and the real reaction of the output of Firm B to the output of Firm A are obtained
as follows,
@xA
@xB
=
2 + c00(xB)
2 + c00(xA)
δA:
and
@xB
@xA
=
2 + c00(xA)
2 + c00(xB)
δB;
The conditions for consistency of conjectural variations are
2 + c00(xB)
2 + c00(xA)
δA = δB;
and
2 + c00(xA)
2 + c00(xB)
δB = δA:
They are the same equations. Therefore, any pair of conjectural variations, δA and δB,
which satisfy the condition,
δA
δB
=
2 + c00(xA)
2 + c00(xB)
; (5)
are consistent. If the firms have the same cost functions, the equilibrium outputs of
firms are equal, and (5) is reduced to
δA = δB: (6)
Also if the cost functions are linear, the second order derivatives of the cost functions
are zero, and we get (6). Thus, if the firms have the same cost functions, or the cost
functions are linear. any common conjectural variations are consistent.
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4 Price setting framework
In this section we assume that the strategic variable of each firm is the price of its good.
Similarly to the previous section, the relative profits of Firm A and B are denoted by
ΠA and ΠB. They are written as follows,
ΠA =piA   piB
=
1
1   b2 [(1   b)a(pA   pB)   p
2
A + p
2
B]   c(xA) + c(xB);
and
ΠB =piB   piA
=
1
1   b2 [(1   b)a(pB   pA)   p
2
B + p
2
A]   c(xB) + c(xA);
with
xA =
1
1   b2 [(1   b)a   pA + bpB];
and
xB =
1
1   b2 [(1   b)a   pB + bpA]:
Firm A determines the price of its good so as to maximize its relative profit assum-
ing that the reaction of the price of the good of Firm B to the price of the good of Firm
A is
@pB
@pA
= ηA;
and Firm B determines the price of its good so as to maximize its relative profit assum-
ing that the reaction of the price of the good of Firm A to the price of the good of Firm
B is
@pA
@pB
= ηB:
The conditions for profit maximization of Firm A and B are, respectively,
(1   b)a   2pA + c0(xA) + bc0(xB) (7)
  [(1   b)a   2pB + c0(xB) + bc0(xA)]ηA = 0;
and
(1   b)a   2pB + c0(xB) + bc0(xA) (8)
  [(1   b)a   2pA + c0(xA) + bc0(xB)]ηB = 0:
From (7) and (8) we have
(1   ηAηB)[(1   b)a + c0(xA) + bc0(xB)]   2(1   ηAηB)pA = 0;
and
(1   ηAηB)[(1   b)a + c0(xB) + bc0(xA)]   2(1   ηAηB)pA = 0:
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Then, the equilibrium prices are
pA =
(1   b)a + c0(xA) + bc0(xB)
2
;
and
pB =
(1   b)a + c0(xB) + bc0(xA)
2
:
They do not depend on the values of ηA or ηB. Thus, the conjectural variations of firms
are irrelevant to the equilibrium prices under relative profit maximization in the price
setting framework. The equilibrium outputs are obtained as follows.
xA =
a   c0(xA)
2
:
and
xB =
a   c0(xB)
2
:
Therefore, the equilibrium prices and outputs under relative profit maximization in the
price setting framework are equal to those in the quantity setting framework.
Again from (7) and (8) the real reaction of the price of the good of Firm A to the
price of the good of Firm B and the real reaction of the price of the good of Firm B to
the price of the good of Firm A are obtained as follows,
@pA
@pB
=
[2 + c00B (xB)   b2c00A (xA)]ηA   b(c00B (xB)   c00A (xA))
2 + c00A (xA)   b2c00B (xB)   bηA(c00A (xA)   c00B (xB))
;
and
@pB
@pA
=
[2 + c00A (xA)   b2c00B (xB)]ηB   b(c00A (xA)   c00B (xB))
2 + c00B (xB)   b2c00A (xA)   bηB(c00B (xB)   c00A (xA))
:
In these calculations we used the ordinary demand functions. The conditions for con-
sistency of conjectural variations are
[2 + c00B (xB)   b2c00A (xA)]ηA   b(c00B (xB)   c00A (xA))
2 + c00A (xA)   b2c00B (xB)   bηA(c00A (xA)   c00B (xB))
= ηB;
and
[2 + c00A (xA)   b2c00B (xB)]ηB   b(c00A (xA)   c00B (xB))
2 + c00B (xB)   b2c00A (xA)   bηB(c00B (xB)   c00A (xA))
= ηA:
They are the same equations, and are reduced to
[2 + c00B (xB)   b2c00A (xA)]ηA + bc00A (xA) + bηAηBc00A (xA) (9)
= [2 + c00A (xA)   b2c00B (xB)]ηB + bc00B (xB) + bηAηBc00B (xB):
Therefore, any pair of conjectural variations, ηA and ηB, which satisfy (9) are consis-
tent. If the firms have the same cost functions, then the equilibrium outputs and the
equilibrium prices of the goods of firms are, respectively, equal, and (9) is reduced to
ηA = ηB: (10)
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Also if the cost functions are linear, the second order derivatives of the cost functions
are zero, and we get (10). Thus, if the firms have the same cost functions, or the cost
functions are linear, any common conjectural variations are consistent.
5 Mixed framework
In this section we assume that the strategic variable of Firm A is the price of its good
and the strategic variable of Firm B is its output. Similarly to the previous sections, the
relative profits of Firm A and B are denoted by ΠA and ΠB. Using (1) and (2), they are
written as follows,
ΠA =piA   piB = (a   pA   bxB)pA
  [(1   b)a   (1   b2)xB + bpA]xB   cA(xA) + cB(xB);
and
ΠB =piB   piA = [(1   b)a   (1   b2)xB + bpA]xB
  (a   pA   bxB)pA   cB(xB) + cA(xA);
with
xA = a   pA   bxB:
Firm A determines the price of its good so as to maximize its relative profit assuming
that the reaction of the output of the good of Firm B to the price of the good of Firm A
is
@xB
@pA
= ζA;
and Firm B determines its output so as to maximize its relative profit assuming that the
reaction of the price of the good of Firm A to the output of Firm B is
@pA
@xB
= ζB:
The conditions for relative profit maximization of Firm A and B are, respectively,
a   2pA   2bxB + c0A(xA) + [ 2bpA   (1   b)a + 2(1   b2)xB + c0B(xB) (11)
+ bc0A(xA)]ζA = 0;
and
  2(1   b2)xB + (1   b)a + 2bpA   c0B(xB)   bc0A(xA) (12)
+ [ a + 2bxB + 2pA   c0A(xA)]ζB = 0:
From (11) and (12) we have
(1 + bζA)[2pA   c0A(xA)] = 2[(1   b2)ζA   b]xB + c0B(xB)ζA + a   (1   b)aζA;
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and
(b + ζB)[2pA   c0A(xA)] = 2[(1   b2)   bζB]xB + aζB   (1   b)a + c0B(xB):
Then, the equilibrium price of the good of Firm A is
pA =
(1   b)a + c0A(xA) + bc0B(xB)
2
:
and the equilibrium output of Firm B is
xB =
a   c0B(xB)
2
:
They do not depend on the values of ζA or ζB. Thus, the conjectural variations of firms
are irrelevant to the equilibrium prices under relative profit maximization in the mixed
framework. The equilibrium output of Firm A and the equilibrium price of the good of
Firm B are obtained as follows.
xA =
a   c0A(xA)
2
:
and
pB =
(1   b)a + c0B(xB) + bc0A(xA)
2
:
Therefore, we find that the equilibrium prices and outputs under relative profit maxi-
mization in the mixed framework are equal to those in the quantity setting framework
and the price setting framework.
Again from (11) and (12) the real reaction of the price of the good of Firm A to the
output of the good of Firm B and the real reaction of the output of Firm B to the price
of the good of Firm A are obtained as follows,
@pA
@xB
=
2[(1   b2)ζA   b] + ζAc00B (xB)   b(1 + bζA)c00A (xA)
(1 + bζA)(2 + c00A (xA))
;
and
@xB
@pA
=
(b + ζB)(2 + c00A (xA))
2[(1   b2)   bζB] + c00B (xB)   b(b + ζB)c00A (xA)
:
Therefore, the conditions for consistency of conjectural variations are
2[(1   b2)ζA   b] + ζAc00B (xB)   b(1 + bζA)c00A (xA)
(1 + bζA)(2 + c00A (xA))
= ζB;
and
(b + ζB)(2 + c00A (xA))
2[(1   b2)   bζB] + c00B (xB)   b(b + ζB)c00A (xA)
= ζA:
We find that they are the same conditions and are reduced to
2[(1   b2)ζA   b] + ζAc00B (xB)   b(1 + bζA)c00A (xA)   (1 + bζA)(2 + c00A (xA))ζB = : (13)
Thus, any pair of conjectural variations which satisfy (13) are consistent under relative
profit maximization in the mixed framework.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, assuming constant conjectural variations, we have shown the irrelevance
of conjectural variations to the equilibrium outputs and prices in duopoly under relative
profit maximization, and that there are multiple consistent conjectures. We hope to
generalize these results to the case of non-constant conjectural variations.
In Tanaka (2013) it was shown that under relative profit maximization Cournot and
Bertrand equilibria in duopoly are equivalent. The results of this paper is an extension
of that result to a duopoly with arbitrary conjectural variations. The equivalence of
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under relative profit maximization, however, may not
hold in oligopoly with more than two firms.
A game of relative profit maximization in a duopoly is a two-person zero-sum
game. In a two-person zero-sum game the payo of one player is an opposite of the
payo of the other player. It seems to be a reason why conjectural variations are ir-
relevant to the equilibrium of duopoly under relative profit maximization. A game of
relative profit maximization in an oligopoly is a multi-person zero-sum game. If the
number of players is larger than two, the payo of one player is not an opposite of the
payo of another player. Thus, probably in an oligopoly the irrelevance of conjectural
variation does not hold unless the oligopoly is symmetric (all firms have the same cost
functions).
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